We use the occasion of a change in tax policy that raised the tax rate for many of the listed companies in China to examine tax-induced earnings management (TEM) from the perspective of political connections. We find that when the tax rate increased, only those affected firms with politically connected management engaged in TEM. This suggests that, in addition to motivation for managing earnings, capability of influencing tax authorities is also an important determinant of TEM. We also find that TEM helped the firms with politically connected management to reduce their tax burden.
Introduction
This paper investigates tax-induced earnings management (TEM) from the perspective of political connections. It is related to two lines of the literature. The first line is TEM. The extant research shows that firms manage their earnings to reduce their tax burden when tax rates change. Dhaliwal and Wang (1992) and Manzon (1992) find that firms move earnings from the period with higher tax rates to the period with lower tax rates while Gramlich, Limpaphayom, and Rhee (2004) show that keiretsu firms strategically shift financially reported income among affiliates in order to reduce overall effective tax rates. Maydew (1997) examines the methods used by firms to move earnings over different periods when the firms engage in TEM. Researchers have also examined the relationship between firm characteristics and TEM and found that large-sized firms (Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson 1992) , high-leveraged firms (Guenther 1994) , and firms subject to aggressive tax policies (Lopez, Regier and Lee 1998) are more likely to engage in TEM.
There are several unsolved issues in the extant research on TEM. Most of the studies in this area are based on a major tax reform in the United States in 1986 which reduced corporate tax rates for all firms. It is not clear whether and how firms conduct TEM when tax rates are expected to increase. Another problem is that while prior studies focus on motivation, they tend to neglect that capability of achieving the goal of earnings management is also important. When the tax rate changes, although the affected firms are motivated to manage their earnings, not all of the firms can actually do so because of the inability to reduce taxes and the punishment from the government associated with earnings management. Finally, studies mainly focus on whether TEM occurs, but it is still unknown whether firms actually lower their tax burden through earnings management.
The second line of the related literature investigates the relationship between government intervention and firm value. Studies show that rent seeking, extraction, and protection are important objectives of government intervention (Stigler 1971; Spiller 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1998) . Vishny (1994, 1998) find that intervention by politicians in business activities is greater when institutional constraints are weak. This finding is extremely important in China where a centrally controlled economy is moving towards a free market economy. On one hand, government intervention can decrease firm value Vishny 1994, 1998) .
Because property rights protection in China is weak and the product and capital markets are far from liberalized, politicians are more likely to pursue social objectives or private gains at the firm's expense. Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) find that firms with politically connected CEOs (a measure of government intervention) perform worse after going public than do firms without politically connected CEOs. Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2012) find that block-share transfers from state-controlled entities to private entities result in improvement in corporate governance and increases in firm value. On the other hand, government intervention and political connections can also increase firm value. China's transition from a centrally controlled economy to a free market economy means that China's economy is still relationship-based rather than market-based. Government privileges are provided to firms with politically connected management. Using survey data, He and Li (2005) show that there is a positive correlation between a firm's performance and management political connections in China. Similarly, Fisman (2001) shows that in Indonesia, a large percentage of a well-connected firm's value is derived from political connections. Johnson and Mitton (2003) also find that Malaysian firms with stronger political connections suffered more when the 1997 Asian financial crisis reduced the government's ability to provide privileges and subsidies, and benefited more when the imposition of capital controls allowed a higher level of subsidies.
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While the above studies have shown that political connections can benefit or hurt a firm, they have paid little attention to the underlying mechanism through which political connections affect firm value. This paper aims to examine whether TEM is such a mechanism. When the tax rate changes, all affected firms are motivated to manage earnings, but this does not mean that all firms will actually do so. As mentioned above, only if the firm has politically connected management, then paying tax based on the managed earnings is possible. In this way, the management political connections help the firm to reduce tax payments. Moreover, if the government discovers the earnings management and thus the firm may face severe punishment, political connections can reduce the probability and/or magnitude of punishment. Hence, not only can political connections help a firm to achieve the goal of reducing its tax burden, but they can also lower the punishment associated with TEM. If we can find empirical evidence that when the tax rate changes, the affected firms with political connections are more likely to engage in earnings management, then this can help us understand an underlying mechanism through which political connections affect firm value. This paper examines the TEM phenomenon from the perspective of political connections using a change in tax policy in China: in 2000, the Chinese central government stipulated a rule that increased the tax rate for some listed companies starting from 2002 as detailed later. Our results show that when the tax rates changed, those affected firms with political connections were more likely to engage in earnings management. Because of the inability to reduce taxes and the punishment associated with TEM, those affected firms without political connections were less likely to engage in earnings management. We also find that those firms with political connections that engaged in earnings management achieved the goal of reducing their tax burden. This paper makes the following contributions. First, we find that in addition to motivation, whether firms are capable (proxied by management political connections) is another important factor that a firm determines whether to engage in TEM. Second, we find that political connections reduced firms' tax burden through earnings management, which can help us understand the underlying mechanism through which political connections affect firm value. Third, the tax reform in our sample increased the tax rate, which makes this study quite different from most of the extant studies, in which the tax rate is decreased. Hence, this study provides complementary evidence on TEM. Finally, as we examine whether TEM actually achieved the goal of lowering the firm's tax burden, our findings help us better understand the economic consequences of TEM.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the background and develop the hypotheses in Section 2. The research design is presented in Section 3.
Empirical results are discussed in Section 4, followed by robustness checks in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Background and hypotheses development
The corporate income tax rate for Chinese listed firms is generally 33%, according to the 1993 Acting Regulations on Corporate Income Tax. However, the central government provides more favorable tax incentives in various regions. For example, there are favorable tax rates of around 15% in the five special economic zones, 32 economic and technology development zones, 13 free trade zones, and 52 high-tech development zones. The central government uses these preferential tax rates to stimulate economic development in specific regions.
Although the tax rates for listed firms are set by the central government, before 2002 the taxes were mostly collected and kept by the local governments in the locations where the firms were registered. Listed firms often contribute to local economic development and bring employment opportunities in addition to large tax revenue. Therefore, the policy of first levying and then rebating taxes (FLTRT) was introduced by local governments to attract capital investment, that is, listed firms first paid tax according to the nominal tax rate of 33%, and then would receive a 18% of reimbursement from the local government, making the actual statutory tax rate approximately 15%.
On October 11, 2000, the Ministry of Finance announced a formal ruling that prohibited local governments from providing FLTRT to listed firms after December 31, 2001. To enforce the termination of FLTRT, the central government also passed another ruling, requiring that local governments surrender 50% of their corporate income tax revenues, which previously were collected by local governments, based on the 33% standard tax rate. Then, in 2003, the percentage of corporate tax revenue given to the central government increased from 50% to 60%. Therefore, it became financially difficult for local authorities to offer companies tax rebates. The new ruling specifically subjected listed companies to the 33% corporate income tax rate.
The direct effect of the termination of FLTRT was that those firms that had previously received the benefit of FLTRT had to pay tax at a higher rate starting from 2002, that is, their tax rate increased from 15% to 33%, while the tax rate for the other firms that were not covered by FLTRT remained unchanged. However, the new Since firm performance is closely related to the ability and effort of the firm's management team, the firm's owner can use, and has been widely using, the firm's performance to evaluate the management team (Holmstrom 1979; Ittner and Larcker 1998) , and accordingly to determine the management team's compensation, promotion, and even continuation of employment. This is true for both privately-controlled and state-controlled firms. Even though in China, state-controlled firms sometimes have other goals such as increasing employment and maintaining social stability, profit maximization is always one of the most important goals for the management team. The State-Owned Enterprises Evaluation Guidelines, which was published by the Chinese government in 1993, 1995 and 1999 respectively, all explicitly require that the evaluation be based on the firm's economic performance. Empirical studies also find that in China, the firms' economic performance significantly affected the management's compensation (Groves et al. 1995) and their turnover (Chang and Wong 2009) . Therefore, FLTRT firms had an incentive to manage their earnings to lower their tax burden.
The termination of FLTRT provided both the incentive and sufficient time for the affected firms to manage earnings. However, this does not mean that the firm would actually do so. There are two reasons. The first reason concerns whether the planned goal of reducing the amount of tax payment could be achieved. Even if the firm managed its earnings, the tax authority might not levy a tax based on the managed earnings as it had the power to levy a tax using other reasonable earnings.
As a result, TEM might not achieve the intended goal. The second reason is the cost associated with earnings management. All listed companies are subject to supervision from the securities regulatory committee and tax authority. TEM violates the information disclosure rule of securities regulations and lowers tax payment.
Hence, once the TEM is discovered, the firm faces severe punishment from both the securities regulatory committee and tax authority. The punishment, or even the incident itself, dramatically damages the firm's value. Therefore, TEM might not be an optimal strategy for some listed firms. It would be optimal only for those firms with the ability to lower their tax burden and avoid punishment. Firms with politically connected management might belong to the latter category. In China, both the securities regulatory committee and tax authority are parts of the government.
The CEO's political affiliation can help the firm lower its tax burden through earnings management and avoid punishment. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis. 
Research design

Models and variables
To facilitate our analysis, we classify the firms into four groups based on their tax and political connection status as follows.
Illustration 1
With FLTRT
Without FLTRT
With PC Group 1 (G1) Group 3 (G3)
Without PC Group 2 (G2) Group 4 (G4)
G1 firms had both FLTRT and political connections and therefore had both the incentive and capability to manage earnings in response to the tax rate change. G2 firms had FLTRT but did not have political connections, that is, they had the incentive to engage in TEM, but did not have the capability to do so. Since G3 firms did not have FLTRT but had political connections, they did not have the incentive to engage in TEM, although they had the capability to do so. Finally, as G4 firms had neither FLTRT nor political connections, they had neither the incentive nor the capability to engage in TEM. Thus, we use G4 firms as the benchmark. 
where At-1 is the total assets at year t-1; △REVt is the revenues in year t less the revenues in year t-1 scaled by the total assets at year t-1; △RECt is the net receivables in year t less the net receivables in year t-1 scaled by the total assets at year t-1; PPEt is the gross property and equipment in year t scaled by the total assets at year t-1; and 0 1 2 ,,
, and 3   are the parameter estimates of the following regression model:
where TA is the total accruals scaled by the lagged total assets. Total accruals are 2 It is true that taxable income and book income are different in China. Taxable income is based on the tax law and the book income is based on the accounting standards. However, their quantitative difference is very small because of the following reasons.
(1) Both taxable income and book income are accruals-based. (2) Taxable income is based on the tax law, but the law does not give a specific definition for many incomes and the accounting standard is used to calculate the taxable income, for example, the difference between costs of finished goods inventory and costs of work-in-process inventory. (3) In reality, the taxable income is usually calculated through adjusting the book income, and the adjustment is usually small. For most of the public firms in China, there are no deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities in their balance sheets, and the underlying reason is that the taxable income is equal to the book income.
computed as
where △CAt is the change in current assets in year t scaled by the total assets at year t-1; △CLt is the change in current liabilities in year t scaled by the total assets at year t-1; △Casht is the change in cash and cash equivalents in year t scaled by the total assets at year t-1; △STDt is the change in debt included in the current liabilities in year t scaled by the total assets at year t-1; and Dept is the depreciation and amortization expense in year t scaled by the total assets at year t-1. Combining equations (1), (2), and (3), we can subtract the nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) from the total accruals to get the discretionary accruals (MDA) of the modified Jones model.
Model (2) 
where MDA is the level of earnings management of a firm, which is calculated above. 0 otherwise. GiYj is the interaction term of Gi and Yj (i = 1,2,3; j = 1,2,3). We expect that the estimated parameter for G1Y2 will be significantly negative, and that all of the other parameters associated with a yearly dummy and/or group dummy will not be significant.
G1, G2, and
In addition, following previous studies, we include the following control variables in regression model (4).
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the year-end total assets of the current year.
There are two different views on the relationship between firm size and earnings management: (1) large firms are less likely to engage in earnings management as they are subject to more supervision from the government (Guenther 1994) ; and (2) large firms have greater lobbying power in the government and thus are more likely to engage in earnings management (Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson 1992) . Hence, the direction of size effect on earnings management is unclear.
LEV is the year-end leverage of the current year, which is defined as the long-term liabilities divided by the total assets. One of the important motives for firms to manage their earnings is to raise finance; therefore, firms with higher leverage are more likely to engage in earnings management (Guenther 1994 ).
However, high leverage means that the firm has already raised finance through debt and thus does not have the motivation to manage earnings so that the performance looks better to raise debt. Hence, the sign of the parameter for leverage in the regression model is also uncertain.
ROA is the return on assets of the current year, which is defined as the earnings before tax divided by the total assets. Accruals constitute a component of earnings.
Firms with a high level of earnings tend to have a high level of discretionary accruals (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995) . To control for the effect of firm performance on discretionary accruals, we employ ROA as a control variable. Lei and Liu (2006) find a similarly positive relationship between ROA and earnings management, although Mitra and Cready (2005) find this relationship to be insignificant.
OCF is operation cash flow which is defined as the year-end operation cash flow divided by total assets. There are two channels through which managers manage earnings, i.e., accruals and cash flows. More cash flows means higher possibility of managing earnings through cash flows, and lower possibility of managing earnings through accruals. However, Chung and Kallapur (2003) find that the correlation between cash flow and level of earnings management can be either positive or negative.
MB is a measure of corporate investment opportunity which is measured by the year-end market value over book value. Skinner and Sloan (2002) find that growth stocks experience a disproportionately large negative stock price response to earnings disappointments (the 'torpedo' effect). Similarly, Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2000) find that high growth firms have incentives to manage earnings upwards to avoid earnings disappointments. Consistent with Skinner and Sloan (2002) , Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2000) and Koh (2007) , we use MB to capture the 'torpedo'
effect. This also controls for the relation between discretionary accruals and growth
options (McNichols 2000).
AL and AD are two dummy variables which represent managing earnings to avoid loss and avoid earnings decreases, respectively. If ROE is positive but less than 0.01, then AL equals 1, and 0 otherwise. ROE is the return on equity of the current year, which is defined as net earnings divided by the year-end equity. If DROE is positive but less than 0.01, then AD equals 1, and 0 otherwise. DROE is the change of ROE of the current year. Avoiding loss and/or avoiding earnings decrease is one of the most important reasons for firms to manage their earnings (Sloan 1996; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser 1999) . This is also true for Chinese listed companies. Wang et al. (2008) find that around 20% of listed firms manage earnings to avoid loss and 6% of listed firms to avoid earnings decrease in China.
PIND is a dummy variable for firms in protected industries. Some industries, because of strategic or other reasons, are under special protection from the government. The probability of earnings management by these firms is smaller (Aharony, Lee and Wong 2000) . Based on the definition of protected industries in Aharony, Lee, and Wong (2000), we classify the raw materials, chemistry, and energy industries as protected industries. If a firm is in a protected industry, then PIND equals 1, and 0 otherwise. The sign of the PIND parameter in the regression is expected to be negative.
AUD is a dummy variable for the type of audit firm hired by the listed company.
If the audit firm is one of the Big Four, AUD equals 1, and 0 otherwise. Extant studies show that the type of audit firm hired by the listed company has an effect on the quality of the financial report. Becker et al. (1998) show that those firms which hired non-Big Four audit firms tend to have larger earnings management.
OPIN is a dummy variable for the type of audit opinion. If the audit opinion is unqualified, OPIN equals 1, and 0 otherwise. Bartov, Gul, and Tsui (2000) find that the discretionary accruals is significantly positively related to qualified audit opinion.
CROSS is a dummy variable for cross listing. If the firm has H shares, then CROSS equals 1, and 0 otherwise. Since cross-listed firms have better corporate governance, we expected them to have lower level of earnings management.
Regional development imbalance is an important feature in the Chinese economy, which affects the enforcement of the tax law and regional ETR difference.
Therefore, we also control for region effect in model (4). 
where ETR is the reported effective tax rate, a common proxy for the corporate tax burden (Porcano 1986; Shevlin and Porter 1992; Gupta and Newberry 1997) . The ETR is defined as the ratio of tax expense over profit before interest and tax
(Porcano 1986). Dummy variables or interaction terms G1, Y1, Y2, Y3, G1Y1, G1Y2,
and G1Y3 are defined as those in equation (1). MDA is the discretionary accruals of a firm, which is calculated above. The tax burden of a firm is lowered as long as the reported earnings are less than the unobservable actual earnings. However, the reported ETR is calculated using the reported earnings. Hence, if G1 firms failed to reduce their tax payment, that is, they paid their tax according to a higher earnings base, then the ETR for these firms would be higher. Hypothesis 2 says that G1 firms would successfully reduce their tax; therefore, we should not observe any additional increase in ETR for G1 firms in 2002. The parameter of G1Y2 in the regression is thus expected to be insignificant. Also, Hypothesis 2 predicts that ETR was independent of the level of earnings management, so the parameter of MDA in the regression is also expected to be insignificant.
Based on previous studies, we also control for size, leverage, capital intensity, inventory intensity, profitability, and investment opportunity. SIZE is measured by the natural logarithm of the year-end total assets of the current year. There are two different views regarding the relationship between firm size and ETR: (1) large firms are subject to greater public scrutiny and as a result, incur a "political cost" in the form of a higher ETR (e.g., Zimmerman 1983); and (2) large firms pay less tax because they can devote more resources to tax planning and political lobbying (e.g.,
Siegfried 1972).
Leverage (LEV) is the year-end leverage of the current year, which is defined as the long-term liabilities divided by the total assets. As interest expenses are deductible for tax purposes in China, firms with higher leverage should have a lower ETR. Alternatively, a positive relation between ETR and leverage is possible if firms with high marginal tax rates are more likely to use debt financing.
Profitability (ROA) is defined as earnings before tax divided by the year-end total assets of the current year. ETR is a function of the ratio of tax privileges to pre-tax accounting income. Due to the imperfect correlation between tax privileges and pre-tax accounting income, ROA affects ETR. Specifically, when tax privileges are positive, i.e., taxable income is less than pre-tax accounting income, ROA and ETR are positively correlated (Wilkie 1988) . However, tax privileges may also be negative, resulting in a negative correlation between ROA and ETR.
Capital intensity (CAPINT) and inventory intensity (INVINT) are the year-end asset mix of the current year (Gupta and Newberry 1997) . CAPINT is defined as the net fixed assets divided by the total assets, and INVINT is defined as the inventory divided by the total assets. Capital intensity may reduce a firm's ETR because of tax-deductible accelerated depreciation relative to the actual asset lives, while inventory intensity is a substitute for capital intensity and should be positively correlated with the ETR (Gupta and Newberry 1997).
Investment opportunity (MB) is defined as the ratio of the year-end market value to the book value of the current year. Growth firms may be those to which the government gives more support and levies less tax on the basis of their perceived potential for economic growth. In addition, future growth may imply high investment and operating costs that could lead to less taxable income and, consequently, a lower ETR.
Data and sample selection
The tax event examined in this paper is the termination of FLTRT starting in (2) all observations in a year-industry group with the number of observations less than 10 as we need to run regressions on samples by year-industry when using the modified Jones model to calculate discretionary accruals accurately (model 2); (3) firms going public in the current year as we need the accounting information of the previous year; (4) observations with missing values in key variables; and (5) extreme observations. After the discretionary accruals are calculated, we consider those observations with MDAs lying outside three standard deviations as outliers.
We manually collected the political connection data from the annual reports of firms. The data source for depreciation and amortization expense is the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. All other data come from the SinoFin Financial Information Service database. Insert Table 2 Here
Empirical results
In Table 3, shows that G2 firms had an incentive to manage earnings downward, but they had no capability to do so. There is also no significant difference in MDA between G3 firms and G4 firms in all years. This shows that neither G3 firms nor G4 firms were affected by the termination of FLTRT, and that neither had an incentive to manage earnings.
Insert Table 3 Here Table 4 reports the regression results of TEM. As expected, except for the interaction term of G1 and Y2, all of the other group dummy variables, year dummy variables, and their interaction terms are not significant. The interaction term of G1
and Y2 is significantly negative, which means that firms affected by the higher tax rate and having politically connected management engaged in earnings management to lower their earnings in 2002. G2 firms faced higher tax rates, but lacked the ability of influencing tax authorities; therefore, we cannot observe significant regression parameters of G2Y2. As G3 firms were not affected by the termination of FLTRT and they did not have an incentive to manage earnings, the coefficient of G3Y2 is also insignificant. The above results confirm Hypothesis 1. 4 The parameter estimates for the control variables in the regression are all reasonable. The coefficient for LEV is significantly positive, which means that firms engage in earnings management to raise finance. As expected, the parameter of firm performance, ROA, is significantly positive. This is consistent with the results in Lei and Liu (2006) . The coefficient for OCF is significantly negative, which is the same as that in Chung and Kallapur (2003) .
Insert Table 4 Here
The results in Table 4 confirm that FLTRT firms with politically connected management managed earnings downward in 2002 in response to the tax rate change, while other firms did not engage in TEM. Next, we examine whether FLTRT firms with politically connected management did eventually manage to lower their tax burden. To obtain a meaningful measure of ETR, we refine the sample used above as follows: (1) we delete observations with a negative denominator (used as the scale for the effective tax rate, in our base case, it is profit before interest and tax); (2) we let ETR equal zero if it is less than zero, and let it equal one if it is larger than one, similar to Zimmerman (1983) . Also, we only keep the observations of FLTRT firms because it is not possible to compare FLTRT firm ETRs with non-FLTRT firm ETRs.
In the end, we have 1056 firm-year observations. The number of firm-year observations in G1 and G2 are 157 and 899, respectively. The detailed distribution is presented in Table 5 .
Insert Table 5 Here Table 6 presents the regression results on the economic consequences of TEM.
As expected, the coefficient of G1Y2 is insignificant, which means there is no evidence to show that there is any additional increase in the reported ETRs for G1 that reported in Gupta and Newberry (1997) . The estimated coefficient of MB is significantly negative at the 1% level, and the coefficients of SIZE, LEV and CAPINT are insignificant.
Insert Table 6 Here
Robustness checks
To check the robustness of our results, we conduct the following additional tests.
First, we use an alternative proxy of earnings management. In Section 3, we used the sales changes net of the change in accounts receivable in the modified Jones model to calculate discretionary accruals. Here, we also follow previous studies and subtract the change in accounts receivable from the sales changes in model (2), that is, equation (2) is replaced by
The other calculations are the same as those in Section 3. In addition, following the Jones model (Jones 1991), we do not consider the change in accounts receivable, that is, we replace equation (1) using
The results based on these measurements of earnings management are qualitatively similar. Finally, following previous studies, we do not use the intercept term in the modified Jones model, and get similar results.
Second, we adopt alternative proxies of ETR. In Section 3, ETR was defined as tax expense/profit before interest and tax. We also use the following three measures:
(1) ETR2 = (tax expense-deferred tax expense)/profit before interest and tax (Porcano 1986 ); ETR3 = (tax expense)/(profit before interest and tax-(deferred tax expense/statutory tax rate)) (Stickney and McGee 1982) ; ETR4 = (tax expense-deferred tax expense)/(profit before interest and tax-(deferred tax expense/statutory tax rate)) (Shevlin 1987) . All of these methods produce similar results.
Third, we use alternative ways to deal with extreme values. In Section 3, we consider those observations with MDAs lying outside three standard deviations as outliers. We also try deleting the upper and lower 1% of observations according to the MDAs. The results are qualitatively similar. In addition, the sample used in Section 3 includes the observations with leverage (LEV) less than 0. We delete those observations and repeat the studies, and we get the same results.
Conclusion
The extant studies on TEM mainly consider the tax reform in the United States in 1986. The reform lowered the tax rate for all companies. There is no evidence whether firms engage in earnings management when tax rates are increased. Also, the studies do not consider the capability of companies to achieve the goal of earnings management. When the tax rate changes, although all affected companies are motivated to manage earnings, some firms are not capable of achieving the goal of earnings management. Furthermore, whether TEM actually helps firms to reduce their tax payment is still an open question. In this paper, we use the termination of the FLTRT policy in China, which raised the tax rate for some listed companies in China starting from 2002, to examine TEM activity. We provide evidence of the effects of capability of achieving the goal of earnings management on firms'
earnings management behavior and the economic consequences of TEM. Moreover, although it provides evidence that political connections affect firm value, the extant 29 research pays little attention to the underlying mechanism or channel. This paper provides direct evidence that political connections reduced firm's tax burden through earnings management.
We find that when the tax rate changed, only those affected firms with politically connected management engaged in TEM. This is because their political connections could help the firms achieve the goal of reducing their tax burden and avoid being punished. We also find that TEM did actually help these firms reduce their tax burden. This finding helps us better understand TEM. It also illustrates an underlying mechanism through which political connections affect firm value. MDA is the level of earnings management, which is calculated using the modified Jones model. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the year-end total assets of the current year. LEV is the year-end leverage of the current year, which is defined as long-term liabilities divided by total assets. ROA is defined as earnings before tax divided by the year-end total assets. OCF is defined as the year-end operation cash flow divided by total assets. MB is the year-end market value over book value. If ROE is positive but less than 0.01, then AL equals 1, and 0 otherwise. ROE is net earnings divided by the year-end equity. If DROE is positive but less than 0.01, then AD equals 1, and 0 otherwise. DROE is the change of ROE of the current year. If a firm is in a protected industry, then PIND equals1, and 0 otherwise. If the audit firm hired by the listed company is one of the Big Four, AUD equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If the audit opinion is unqualified, OPIN equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If the firm has H shares, then CROSS equals 1, and 0 otherwise. G1 firms are firms that had both FLTRT and politically connected management. G2 firms are firms that had FLTRT, but didn't have politically connected management. G3 firms are firms that didn't have FLTRT, but had politically connected management. G4 firms are firms that had neither FLTRT nor politically connected management. If a firm was an FLTRT firm and had politically connected management, then G1 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If a firm was an FLTRT firm but did not have politically connected management, then G2 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If a firm was not an FLTRT firm but had politically connected management, then G3 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. GiYj is the interaction term of Gi and Yj (i=1, 2, 3; j=1, 2, 3) . SIZE is the natural logarithm of the year-end total asset of the current year. LEV is the year-end leverage of the current year, which is defined as long-term liabilities divided by total assets. ROA is defined as earnings before tax divided by the year-end total assets. OCF is defined as the year-end operation cash flow divided by total assets. MB is the year-end market value over book value. If ROE is positive but less than 0.01, then AL equals 1, and 0 otherwise. ROE is net earnings divided by the year-end equity.
If DROE is positive but less than 0.01, then AD equals 1, and 0 otherwise. DROE is the change of ROE of the current year. If a firm is in a protected industry, then PIND equals1, and 0 otherwise. If the audit firm hired by the listed company is one of the Big Four, AUD equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If the audit opinion is unqualified, OPIN equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If the firm has H shares, then CROSS equals 1, and 0 otherwise. ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level. FLTRT firm and had politically connected management, then G1 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. G1Y1 (G1Y2/G1Y3) is the interaction term of G1 and Y1 (Y2/Y3). MDA is the level of earnings management, which is calculated using the modified Jones model. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the year-end total asset of the current year. LEV is the year-end leverage of the current year, which is defined as long-term liabilities divided by total assets. ROA is the return on asset of the current year, which is defined as earnings before tax divided by total asset. CAPINT is defined as the year-end net fixed assets divided by total assets of the current year. INVINT is defined as the year-end inventory divided by total assets by the current year. MB is defined as the year-end market to book value of the current year. ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level.
